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Abstract: A model of taxation for cooperative n-person games i  introduced where proper coalitions 
are taxed proportionally to their value. Games with non-empty core under taxation at rate e are 
a-balanced. Sharp bounds on e in matching ames on (not necessarily bipartite) graphs are estab- 
lished. Upper and lower bounds on the smallest ein bin packing ames are derived and euclidean 
random TSP games are seen to be, with high probability, e-balanced for e ~ 0.06. 
Key Words: cooperative game, balanced, core, tax, matching, bin packing, traveling salesman 
I Introduction 
For our purposes, a cooperative game is just a function v, the characteristic 
function of the game, that assigns to each coalition S ~_ N of a finite set N 
of players a real number v(S). We consider games where v(S) arises as the 
optimal value of a combinatorial optimization problem defined by S. Typically, 
"optimization" will mean "maximization" (e.g., matching, bin packing). In case 
of"minimization", we speak of a cost game (e.g., minimum spanning tree, travel- 
ing salesman). The discussion of minimization games is completely analogous to 
maximization games. 
A solution concept tries to distribute the value v(N) of the grand coalition N 
among the individual players in an acceptable manner. Doubtless, the intuitively 
most attractive solution concept is the core of a game, which consists of those 
vectors x ~ ~N with component sum x(N) = v(N) and S-restricted component 
sum x(S) >_ v(S) for all S c N. Games with a non-empty core are balanced. 
Unfortunately, many interesting ames are not balanced. This means that one 
either has to introduce a completely different solution concept (e.g., Shapley 
value) or one has to modify the notion of"core". A model for the latter goes back 
to Shapley and Shubik [1966]. In that model, a proper coalition S c N is taxed 
by a constant e or with rate e proportionally to its size so that the value is 
reduced to v(S) - ~ or v(S) - e IS[ resp.. Tijs and Driessen [1986] propose a tax 
proport ional to the difference v(S) - ~ v(i). One now seeks a core vector in the 
taxed game, thereby trying to keep the tax(rate) e "small". 
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In the present note, we suggest a model of taxation where the tax imposed on 
a proper coalition S c N is proportional to its value v(S). This is the usual idea 
behind a sales tax and, therefore, appears to be quite realistic. We thus reduce 
that value v(S) to (1 - e)v(S). A game with non-empty core after taxation with 
rate e is e-balanced. In this sense, e-taxation provides an e-approximation to
balancedness. 
In Section 2, we relate e-balancedness to the usual definition of balancedness 
via the analogue of Bondareva's [1963] and Shapley's [1967] theorem. The 
optimal e for matching games on arbitrary (possibly non-bipartite) graphs is 
determined in Section 3. Section 4 introduces bin packing games and derives (not 
sharp) bounds on the best e. Finally, we discuss traveling salesman games and 
argue that large euclidean game instances are, with high probability, e-balanced 
for e ~ 0.06. 
2 e-Balancedness and e-Core Allocations 
In this section, we introduce the notion of e-balanced games and the e-core of a 
game. Arguing along the same lines as in Bondareva [1963] and Shapley [1967], 
we conclude that e-balanced games are characterized by the existence of non- 
empty e-cores (Theorem 1below). 
Let the cooperative game v with the set N of players be given by its character- 
istic function 
v: 2N---~ ~ , 
where v(~b) = 0. Denoting by ls the indicator function of an arbitrary coalition 
S _~ N, we say that v is e-balanced for e > 0 if for all $1, $2, . . . ,  Sk c N and 
parameters 2($1) . . . . .  2(Sk) E ~+, 
k k 
2(Sj)lsj = 1N implies (1 - e) ~ 2(Sj)v(Sj) < v(N) 
j= l  j= l  
The e-core K~(v) of v consists of all allocation vectors x ~ EN such that 
i) x(N) = v(N) 
ii) x(S) > (1 - e)v(S) for all S = N, 
where, as usual, x(S) = ~, x(i). 
i tS  
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Our first result seemingly extends the theorem of Bondareva nd Shapley (the 
case e = 0 in our notation). Actually, it is easily seen to be equivalent to that 
theorem by considering the game v~: 2 N -o R, where 
(1 -e)v(S) 
v~(s)= v(S) 
ifS r  
ifS = N . 
We therefore only sketch the simple direct proof. 
Theorem I: The game v: 2 N -o R is e-balanced if and only if K,(v) 4: ~b. 
Proof: Consider the linear program (LP): 
max 2uv(N) + (1 - e) ~ 2sv(S) 
SeN 
such that2 N+ ~ 2 s<0 
S~i  
2 Nfree, 2 s>_0(SCN)  . 
By linear programming duality, Ks(v) v~ q~ is tantamount to saying that each 
feasible solution 2 for (LP) yields objective function value < 0, i.e., any choice of 
numbers 2~ > 0 (S c N) and 2~v with the property 
Z ~! t Zs = 2N for all i E N , 
S~i 
necessarily satisfies (1 - ~) ~ 2~v(S) < 2]vv(N). 
S=N 
[] 
Rather than verifying the condition for e-balancedness directly, Theorem 1 
allows us to exhibit allocation vectors in the e-core instead. We will now turn 
our attention to the study of e-balancedness of some combinatorial games that 
are known to be generally not O-balanced. 
Before doing so, we want to relate our z-core with the z-tax core of Tijs and 
Driessen [1986] that consists of those vectors x e ~N with the properties 
i) x(N) = v(N) 
ii) x(S) >_ (1 - e)v(S) + e ~ v(i) 
ieS  
i fScN.  
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It is not hard to find games with empty e-tax core but non-empty e-core. Indeed, 
for non-negative games, the e-core is a more general solution concept. On the 
other hand, both concepts coincide for games v with v(i)= 0 for each i e N. 
Examples of the latter are the matching ames in Section 3. 
A vector x e R N is an imputation for the game v is x distributes v(N) and is 
individually rational, i.e., if 
i) x(N) = v(N) 
ii') x(i) >_ v(i) for all i e N. 
Note that any vector in the e-tax core is an imputation while the e-core may 
contain also vectors that are not individually rational. In the games we consider 
below, however, we will always exhibit imputations in the z-core. 
3 Matching Games 
Let G = (N, E) be a graph on the vertex set N with the set E of edges. We assume 
that G is (edge-) weighted via 
w:E~N . 
Thinking of N as a set of players, define the value v(S) of the coalition S _ N in 
the matching ame v relative to w by 
v(S) = max {w(M)[M c_ E(S) matching} , 
where E(S) is the set of edges joining two vertices in S. (Recall that a matching 
in G is a set of pairwise disjoint edges). 
It is well-known that the matching game is O-balanced if the graph G is 
bipartite, i.e., if G contains no circuit of odd length > 3 (cf. Shapley and Shubik 
[1972-1). On the other hand, there are matching ames with empty O-core (take 
G to be triangle with w = 1). 
Theorem 2: Assume that G = (N, E) contains no circuit of odd length smaller 
1 d than k. Then the associated matching ame v is ~-balance . 
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Proof: For any coalition S ~_ N, v(S) is the optimal value of the integer linear 
program ILP(S): 
max ~, w(e)x e
e~E 
such that ~x~_<l i f ieS 
e~i 
xe <O i f i r  
e~i 
Xe~{O , 1} . 
Relaxing the integrality constraints xe ~ {0, 1} to 0 < xe < 1, we obtain the 
associated linear program LP(S), whose optimal value we denote by g(S). Clearly 
v(s) >_ v(S). 
The game ~ is a linear production game in the sense of Owen [1975] and hence 
has a non-empty O-core. Choose ~ ~ Ko(~ ) and define z ~ ~N via 
v(N) 
z(i) = ~( i ) ' - -  for all i ~ N . 
~(N) 
By Lemma 3 below, we have in particular v(N)/~(N) > (1 -  ~). Thus 
v(N) 
z(S) = -~(S)'-(~) >__ V(S) ' - -  
_> v(S).(1-~) 
v(N) 
5(N) 
[] 
Lemma 3: Under the conditions of the proof of Theorem 2, we have 
1 
v(S) > (1 -  ~) ~(S). 
Proof: We use the fact (cf. Lovfisz and Plummer [1986], Chap. 7) that the linear 
program LP(S) has an optimal solution x ~ R E such that for all e ~ E, 
x~=O or x~=89 or x~=l  . 
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Moreover, the set {e ~ Elxe = 89 is a union of a disjoint circuits of odd length. 
Let C be such a circuit. The contribution of C towards ~(S) is 
1 ~" y~ w(e). 
e~C 
We claim that C contains a matching M of weight 
(1), 
w(M) >_ 1 -~ "~ 2 w(e) . 
eeC 
Let the edge m ~ C have minimal weight in C. Now C\{m} contains two disjoint 
matchings because ]C[ is odd. So one of them has weight at least 
w(e)- w(m) > 2 w(e) - - - -  2 w(e) 
2 ~c -2~c  21c1~c 
_1  1 
Thus, by replacing all odd circuits C with Xtc = 89 by an appropriate matching, 
we obtain a matching in S with weight at least ( i -  ~) ~(S). [] 
We remark that Theorem 2 is "best possible". It is straightforward to see 
that the cardinality matching ame (i.e., w - 1) on an odd circuit of length k is 
1 
not e-balanced for any e < ~. 
Corollary 4: (cf. Shapley and Shubik [1972]): If G is bipartite, then the matching 
game is balanced. [] 
4 Bin Packing Games 
We introduce the following combinatorial game: There are n items of sizes ax, 
.... a, ~ •+ and m bins of sizes bx . . . . .  bm ~ •, where we assume that each item i 
fits into any bin j, i.e., a i < bi for all i and all j. The set N of players consists of 
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all items and all bins. In particular, IN[ = n + m. A coalition S c N comprises a
set A ~ {1,...,  n} of items and a set B ~ {1 . . . .  , m} of bins. The value v(S) is 
defined as the maximum total size of items in A that can be packed into bins in 
B. So 
v(S)  = max ~ ~ a i , 
j= l  i~Aj 
where the maximum is taken over all pairwise disjoint subsets A~ . . . . .  AIB I of A 
such that 
a~ <_ bj . 
iEAj 
To illustrate a bin packing game, imagine that the "bins" are trucks of capacity 
b~. The items produce a profit proportional to their size al if they are brought o 
a market place. The value v(N) of the grand coalition thus represents he maxi- 
mum profit achievable. Note that v(N)is bounded by min{~ a,, ~ bj}. 
How should v(N) be allocated to the "owners" of the items and the "owners" 
of the bins? 
We first show that we cannot guarantee e-balancedness for general bin pack- 
ing games unless e > -~. 
Proposition 5: Let e _> 0 be such that every bin packing game is z-balanced. Then 
e~.  
Proof: Take 2 bins with capacity bl = bl = 2 and 5 items of size al = a 2 = 
t ! t l+6 ,  a l=a2=a3=l forsome0<6<l .  
Consider the coalitions S, = {b 1, a~, a~}, S 2 = {b 2, a~, a~}, S 3 = {bl, b 2, al, 
a2, a~, a~} and $4 = {al, a2}. 
4 
Then ~ lsj = 2" 1N and, therefore, the balancedness conditions imply 
j~ l  
4 
(1 - e) ~ v(Sj) < 2"v(N) = 6 + 26 . 
j= l  
Now v(S1) = v(S2) = 2, v(S3) = 3 + 6, v(S4) = 0, Letting 6 --* 0, we see that e > 
must hold. [] 
148 u. Faigle and W. Kern 
Theorem 6: Each bin packing game is 89 
Proof" For the items al, ..., a. and bins bl, ..., bin, we set a = a 1 + ... + a, and 
b = b I + ... + b,,. There are two cases to be distinguished. 
Case 1: a > v(N) (i.e. the grand coalition is short of truck drivers). 
We allocate nothing to the item owners and assign to truck driverj the value 
x~= v(N). 
We must show that x(S) > 89 holds for any coalition S in the bin packing 
game. This will follow once we can demonstrate hat there is an optimal bin 
packing in which every bin is at least half full because then v(N) > 89 and so 
1 1 
x(S)>~ ~, bj> j~s  _ -2 v(S) .  
Consider an optimal bin packing and suppose bin j is less than half full. 
Because a > v(N), there is an item as that is not in any bin. Because the current 
packing is optimal, we have a t _> 89 On the other hand, a t _< bj (the fundamental 
assumption in our model) implies that we would improve the current solution 
by replacing the content of bin j with as. 
Case 2: a = v(N). 
In this case, we assign nothing to the truck owners and allocate to the owner 
of item i the value 
X i ~ a i . 
This allocation obviously satisfies x(S) > v(S) for any coalition S, [] 
Our results show that the smallest e for which every bin packing game is 
e-balanced lies between 1/7 and 1/2. Are there sharper bounds? It should also be 
interesting to study the bin packing game in a more general framework where 
at < bj does not necessarily hold and the profit p~ gained from packing item as 
may be independent from its size. 
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5 TSP Games 
TSP games ("Traveling Salesman" games) can be motivated by a repairman who 
starts from his home 0 and visits the customers N = { 1 . . . . .  n} before returning 
home (cf. Tamir [1989] and Potters et al. [1992]). Hence we consider a graph G 
on the vertex set N w {0} whose edges correspond to links connecting customers. 
Each link e is weighted by its (non-negative) length d(e). Taking N to be a set of 
players, the associated TSP game evaluates the cost c(S) of any coalition S ___ N 
as 
c(S) = length of a shortest tour through S u {0} . 
We seek to distribute the total cost c(N) of the grand coalition among the players 
N. Similarly to the foregoing, we define the e-core K,(c) of the cost 9ame c to 
consist of all vectors x ~ ~N such that 
i) x(N) = c(N) 
ii) x(S) < (1 + e)c(S) for all S c N. 
In the model we discuss in this section, we will assume throughout that the graph 
G is undirected and that the edge lengths atisfy the triangle inequality. Without 
going into details, let us remark here that one can exhibit an example of a TSP 
game with empty O-core whose underlying raph satisfies the above require- 
ments (Tamir 1-1989]). 
In fact, there are even euclidean TSP games with empty O-core (Faigle and 
Kern [t993]). (Recall that a euclidean TSP game, by definition, arises from 
choosing the vertex set in the plane •" and considering the euclidean distances 
between pairs of points (see also below)). 
In the following, we denote by L = v(N) the length of the shortest tour and by 
T the length of a minimum spanning tree in G. 
Theorem 7: I fL  < (1 + e)T, then the TSP game c has a non-empty e-core. 
Proof: The MST ("Minimum Spanning Tree") game ~ associated with G is given 
by 
~(S) = length of an MST on S u {0} . 
It is well-known that ~ has a non-empty O-core (cf. Claus and Kleitman [1973]). 
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Choose 2 ~ Ko(~ ) and define x ~ R ~ via 
L 
x(i) = 2(i)~ for i e N . 
We claim: x ~ KAc). 
Because T = 2(N), we obtain x(N) = L. Moreover, c(S) > ~(S) implies 
x(S) = z(s )  L <_ ~(S)(l + ~) <_ (1 + ,)c(S) . [] 
Note that L < 2T always holds since a (in general non-optimal) tour can be 
constructed by the following standard procedure: double the edges of the opti- 
mal tree in order to obtain an eulerian graph on N u {0}. Trace the eulerian 
tour of length 2T and take "shortcuts" using the triangle inequality. There 
results a tour of length _< 2T. 
In many situations, the e in the hypothesis of Theorem 6 is quite small. 
Consider, for example, the euclidean TSP and let U := [0, 1] 2 be the unit square 
with center Xo = (89 1) ~ U. Choose xl, ..., x, e U and define G = (V, E) to be 
the complete graph on V = N u {0} with edge lengths 
c(i,j) = I lx/ -  xj[12 9 
It is known that with high probability 
L ~ 0.72x/n and T ,~ 0.68v/n 
(cf. Kern [1989], Rhee and Talagrand [1989], Steele [1990], Goemans and 
Bertsimas [1991]). More precisely, it has been shown that there exist constants 
/~r and/~r such that for independent, uniformly distributed random variables 
XI, X2, ... in U, 
Prob(lL(X 1 . . . . .  X,) -/~Lx/~] >_ ax/~) 
and 
Prob(I T(X1 . . . . .  X.) - / ? rx /n l  > ax/~) 
become exponentially small as n ---, oo for any fixed ~t > 0. Numerical experi- 
ments (Goemans and Bertsimas [1991]) suggest hat flL "~ 0.72 and fir ~ 0.68. 
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Hence, for large n, we will have 
151 
L < 1.06 T 
with high probability, which guarantees an e-core with e ,~ 0.06. 
Another possible allocation rule for the TSP game is motivated by the follow- 
ing relaxation of the TSP problem. As above, let c/j denote the distance between 
nodes i and j. Define, for each coalition S _ N 
~(S) := min y. cox o 
( i , j )~E 
(i, j) e E else 
x o > 2 V~ ~ T c Svo {0} 
ie T, iq~T 
xo>O . 
Obviously, any optimal tour through S w {0} satisfies these constraints ( o called 
"degree constraints" and "subtour elimination constraints"). As observed al- 
ready by Tamir [1989], [1991] and others, the game defined by g has nonempty 
core. (In fact, a vector 2 in the core of this game can be computed efficiently.) If
is a vector in the core of the game defined by g, then 
L 
x(i) := Y:(i).a(N) , 
(where, again, L denotes the length of an optimum tour through N w {0}) defines 
an allocation for the TSP game. Obviously, 
. L _ L 1 
x(S) < x (S) .~  <_ c(S).- -(~ < c(S). (X~ ) 
It has been shown by Wolsey [1980] that the ratio L/?(N) is at most 3/2, 
assuming the triangle inequality for the distances c u. Thus, this allocation rule 
yields a vector x in the 89 of the TSP-game. It has been conjectured that the 
above ratio is bounded by 4/3. In the euclidean case, empirical results on random 
problems with uniformly distributed points in the unit sqare seem to imply 
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that, on the average,  
c(N) >_ 0.70" x /~ , 
(cf. Goemans  andBer ts imas  [1991]). Thus,  with high probabi l i ty ,  a random TSP  
game has nonempty  e-core even for 
0.72 
~ - -  ~ 0.03 . 
0.70 
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